Fiscal policy in the context of varieties of capitalism by Picker, Nils
A work project, present as part of the requirements for the award of a Master Degree in 
Economics from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics 
Fiscal Policy in the 
Context of Varieties of 
Capitalism 
 
A project carried out on the Master in Economics Program under the supervision of: 
Professor José A. Tavares 
 
by 






In the recent literature the impact of institutional variables on macroeconomic policy 
outcomes has been largely ignored. However one particular strand of the political economy 
has lately shed some light on the relationship between fiscal policy and its effects on 
economic growth by distinguishing the type of capitalism which characterizes developed 
countries. In this paper I will follow this so-called Varieties of Capitalism approach to 
examine the question, whether fiscal policy in liberal market economies is more effective 
than in non-liberal ones  due to institutional complementarities. For this purpose I rely on a 
mixed-methodology, first using vector autoregressive models to determine fiscal multipliers 
across 19 OECD countries, before investigating by which institutional factors expansionary 
fiscal effects might be influenced. Indeed, significant difference in the size of the multiplier 
between the two production regimes can be found. However, the obtained results seem 
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The effects of fiscal policy on the economy are of ongoing interest to economic policymakers. 
Recently, the US, European, and various other governments intend to weaken or avoid a 
potential recession related to financial market turbulences by large fiscal stimulus packages or 
massive tax cuts. Many papers about the relation between fiscal policy and economic growth 
postulate quasi homogenous fiscal multipliers across countries. I would like to question this 
view and demonstrate that there is probably a great portion of cross-country heterogeneity in 
this relation. What is missing in most empirical investigations so far is a comparison of 
economic systems that are not only split by the stage of institutional development but by 
various types of production systems, for example different ideals of institutional settings. 
Following the 'Varieties of Capitalism' literature, which was initiated by Hall and Soskice in 
2001, different types of institutional settings characterize different market and production 
regimes in the economy. Basically two polar cases have been identified by this literature. The 
first one is the Liberal Market Economy (LME) containing mostly Anglo-Saxon countries, 
who mainly rely on deregulated markets to acquire coordination among economic actors, 
while price signals and formal contracting are its primary mechanisms. In contrast to those 
liberal market economies, Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), mainly Scandinavian and 
Continental European countries can be distinguished by the 'Varieties of Capitalism'-
literature, where coordinated collective actions by the state or unions play meaningful roles 
and affect procedures of strategic interaction. I will demonstrate that various production 
regimes as illustrated in the 'VoC'-literature deliver a narrative for heterogeneity between 
categories of countries regarding growth effects of fiscal policy. My core argument is that 
different economic systems lead to different degrees of fiscal uncertainty and effectiveness 
due to certain institutional features, which significantly characterize the economic growth at 
similar fiscal adjustments and by this generate a source of heterogeneity in the fiscal 
multipliers between LMEs and CMEs.  
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2. Theoretical Part: Varieties of Capitalism in a Comparative Analysis 
When comparing both, the understanding how differences in their institutional characteristics 
effect their economic performance is key. The concept of path dependence by Bebchuck and 
Roe (1999) explains why the differences in multiple institutional spheres in developed 
economies are strongly persistent over time, although the powerful forces of globalization 
push them to international convergence. Because of this path dependence, a country's pattern 
of institutional features at any point in time depends partly on the patterns it maintained 
earlier. Consequently, when countries possessed different industrial relations or rules at earlier 
points in time because of their different circumstances at that time, or even because of 
historical accidents these differences might persist in their present even if their economies 
have otherwise converged. However, one should bear in mind that probably more than one 
strategy can deliver economic success. In a liberal market economy, companies are 
confronted with large stock markets marked by high levels of transparency and dispersed 
shareholding, while companies' financing opportunities strongly depend on market valuation. 
In addition regulatory authorities allow contested takeovers that rely on stock prices, driving 
executive directors more sensitive to the ongoing profitability of their company. Technology 
transfer is usually achieved by licensing or recruiting expert staff, while standards are mostly 
determined by competitive market mechanisms. Besides, executive directors enjoy essential 
power and control over all aspects of corporate strategy. In this scenario, most of the business 
relations are shaped by the competitive character of unregulated markets. Moreover, because 
labor markets are more fluid in such a liberal environment, workers have stronger incentives 
to invest in general skills that can be taken to other jobs, and, because industry associations 
are weak, companies cannot offer in-house vocational training systems, which could impart 
industry-specific skills. In contrary firms of CMEs are closely linked by dense networks of 
cross-shareholding and powerful industry associations. These business networks also play a 
major role in standard setting, providing opportunities for technology transfers and allowing 
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firms to develop reputations that grant access to capital on terms that less depend on their 
stock market values. Correspondingly, executive directors are less sensitive to ongoing 
profits. In most industries, labor unions and employers associations manage concerted 
vocational training systems, endowing employees with firm or sector-specific skills and 
private supplementary insurances, if they take part in them. In the presence of influential labor 
unions and industry associations, executive director enjoy less freedom for solo runs, and 
companies usually prefer a more consensual style of decision-making. To accomplish their 
primary purposes, companies in CMEs have to rely more strongly on strategic interaction. 
Nevertheless, the quality of the results and the institutional setting for strategic coordination 
may still differ across countries. Especially the Mediterranean economies (Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) are often described as 'Mixed Market Economies', because they do not seem to possess 
all essential features of an archetype-CME. Labor unions and employers associations are less 
organized in these countries compared to other CMEs and therefore many coordination 
problems have to be solved by the state as key actor. For example public regulators play an 
important role in the allocation of credits by banks. 
 
Aggregated Demand Management Regimes (ADMR) 
Consequently the 'VoC'-literature (Soskice, 2007) has stated that different types of production 
regimes should show various fiscal political reactions to macroeconomic shocks. The demand 
for a counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy should differ in each variety, because LMEs and 
CMEs support various institutional characteristics in the sub-spheres of VoC in particular: 
industrial relations, education and vocational training, corporate governance, and inter-firm 
relations (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Correspondingly, each variety of capitalism has developed 
its own aggregate demand management regime to solve comparable macroeconomic problems 
with differentiated, type-specific political reactions. In recent contributions, Carlin and 
Soskice (2009) as well as Iversen and Soskice (2010) have argued that liberal market 
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economies would manage a more generous and more counter-cyclical fiscal policy than non-
liberal market economies. Under similar economic condition, for example in the face of a 
recession, non-liberal market economies would implement a restrictive budget policy in order 
to constraint public debt, while their liberal counterparts prefer a looser stance on budgetary 
politics to mitigate the painful effects of an economic downturn on growth or unemployment. 
Besides, a more conservative stance on monetary policy should be considered as superior 
solution in CMEs, due to the fact that it is complementary to a collective wage bargaining 
strategy by unions in the Small-N case, since tough monetary authorities require tough fiscal 
authorities for their own credibility. Consequently, my core argument is that powerful 
complementarities tie ADMRs into the context of fiscal policy, linking production regimes 
with welfare states and political systems. Different demand management regimes lead to 
different restrictions and opportunities that each style of production regime would face. LMEs 
for example are characterized by a relatively low level of social protection. Contrary to this, 
non-liberal market economies afford a much more active and accommodating type of welfare 
state. As already mentioned above, past economic circumstances may explain these 
differences accordingly to the concept of path dependence. For instance Fordism and mass 
semi-skilled workforces were more important in those economies, which became LMEs. 
Since they have been long characterized by the absence of well-organized, nation-wide labor 
unions and coordinated employer movements, which are necessary to create vocational 
training systems, these mainly Anglo-Saxon economies moved strategically towards flexible 
labor markets. As a result LMEs rest their ability to compete on operations that get along with 
a general skilled workforce (Iversen, 2005). In case of a lay-off workers should find a new job 
more easily, because the industrial sector in these countries does not necessarily require 
specific-skilled labor. Since neither employees nor employers have an incentive to invest in 
vocational training, which could not significantly contribute to the productivity or 
competitiveness of the firms, there would be no need to protect specific-skills by a labor 
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union or the state. In contrast, coordinated market economies’ ability to compete relies mostly 
on operations that demand a workforce with firm- or industry-specific skills. In this case, the 
presence of a strongly protective employment law works as an ex-ante incentive to adopt 
firm- or industry-specific skills. Correspondingly, one would expect labor protection and 
social insurance systems in coordinated market economies to be more extensive. As a result 
non-liberal market economies maintain large and efficient “automatic stabilizers”, while their 
liberal counterparts have mostly deficiencies on that domain. Thus, liberal market economies 
require massive discretionary fiscal responses to compensate for macroeconomic shocks, 
while non-liberal market economies can rest on their automatic stabilizers to manage an 
economic crisis. Amable and Azizi (2013) have shown that in contrary to Soskice's prediction 
liberal market economies operate far less counter-cyclical in terms of fiscal policies than 
coordinated market economies. As it turned out, the complementarities between the fiscal 
political stance and the institutional features in a particular state consequently appear to vary 
corresponding to the type of production regime, but not in the direction, which is suggested by 
the VoC-literature.  
 
Complementarities in VoCs and the Fiscal Multiplier 
A second prediction by Soskice (2007) is the hypothesis that governments of CMEs run a less 
effective fiscal policy than those of LMEs, which may be appropriate due to the industry-
specific skills of employees in non-liberal economies. Regarding labor relations companies 
must solve the issue of providing their employees with proper skills, while the workforce 
must decide how much to invest in which ability. Not only the success of individual firms and 
employees but the qualification level and competitiveness of the overall economy rest on the 
results of this coordination problem. In a non-liberal environment the workforce would likely 
respond pro-cyclically and by this create more precautionary savings in times of recession 
than under liberal conditions, because it could be much more difficult for them to find a new 
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job on regulated labor markets in case of a lay-off. Furthermore, because these rigid labor 
market are dominated by specific skills, there is a potential negative externality. The number 
of vacancies within a given category of employment will likely be limited, if the major part of 
employees have long-term employment contracts. Hence, firms will try to occupy open 
positions with trainees. Consequently the supply of mid-career vacancies is quite short. In any 
case, the fear for rising unemployment could increase pressure on governments to reform 
social security systems and cut public spending. In result, also well-trained workers in stable 
jobs might react pessimistic by building up their savings. Following Modigliani's life-cycle 
hypothesis, savings do not arise out of an interest rate incentive to substitute future for current 
expenditure but from precautionary savings in reaction to actual reductions in public old-age 
provision. Furthermore, a precautionary saver will prefer to buy government bonds rather than 
private bonds, which will create stronger crowding-out effects in CMEs during fiscal 
expansions. As a consequence fiscal multipliers are smaller and therefore counter-cyclical 
fiscal stimuli become less efficient. However, this second prediction of Soskice has been 
largely ignored by the recent literature and not been verified yet. The latest international 
financial and economic crisis confronted all OECD member states with similar economic 
challenges. Nevertheless policymakers from different institutional backgrounds present 
different narratives and solutions towards this crisis. Since the economic consequences of 
fiscal adjustment might vary across countries, according to their production regimes, any 
policy advice should consider the institutional environment. Thus, it seems reasonable, that 
Central European economists and politicians are mainly worried about budgetary 
consolidation as a prerequisite for growth. Their Anglo Saxon counterparts on the other side 
consider debt effects as trivial and call for more extensive public spending in times of 
recession. Both opinions seem plausible, because the relation between fiscal adjustments and 
growth can vary across countries. In this regard economic systems matter, because production 




To examine if there is correlation between the efficiency of fiscal policy by developed 
economies and their respective type of production system, a mixed-methodology approach is 
conducted in this paper. First 20 vector autoregressive models (VARs) are run to determine 
the size of the fiscal multiplier across countries. While proceeding this first step I realized that 
in the case of New Zealand the accessible data set was just too poor to produce reasonable 
results. Thus, I decided to drop this observation before going ahead to the second regression. 
In the second step a cross-sectional OLS regression was performed on the 19 remaining 
country-specific multipliers with two coordination indices and some specific institutional 
explanatory variables all related to the varieties of capitalism approach.  
 
Empirical strategies for fiscal policy analysis 
The empirical investigation of the impacts of expansionary spending is performed with a 
vector autoregressive approach. Older studies about budgetary policy have usually rest on the 
cyclically-adjusted primary deficit as benchmark for the budgetary stand. But the adjusted 
deficit is inconvenient in econometric evaluations, because no theory entails that spending 
hikes and tax reductions have necessarily the same impact on growth. Nevertheless, the 
adjusted deficit can still provide information about the current policy. In addition to the 
existing debate on the size of the fiscal multipliers, there is great controversy concerning how 
one should identify fiscal shocks. The identification problem emerges since two causal 
directions are conceivable. Either government expenditure has an effect on GDP or GDP 
shapes government expenditure via automatic stabilizers or policy rules. Thus, there are two 
strategies to solve the identification problem: the vector autoregressive framework (VAR), 
which was used for the first time in fiscal political investigations by Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) and the natural experiment of large military buildups. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use 
news of forthcoming military buildups as the shock variable, instead of applying military 
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buildups as itself to identify fiscal shocks. Their identification strategy rests on the fact that it 
is very improbable that military buildups are induced by the business cycle and are 
consequently exogenous fiscal shocks.  
 
A Vector Autoregressive Approach 
The fundamental supposition behind the vector autoregressive framework is that fiscal policy 
needs some time, which is estimated to be at least one-quarter, to react to new information 
about the business cycle. Since government expenditure and taxation are supposed to have an 
influence on GDP, the two are unlikely independent. Consequently for estimating the effects 
of the one it is also necessary to include the other. Following a vector autoregressive model to 
remove foreseeable responses of the two variables to each other, it can be supposed that any 
remaining correlation between the unpredicted components of public expenditure and GDP is 
because of the effect of public expenditure on GDP. The main difficulty is that identified 
shocks may still have been known to private agents. In the small number of OECD economies 
that have been analyzed so far, the existing spectrum of estimates in the VAR literature differs 
significantly. For instance, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) determine a fiscal multiplier of 
nearby 1 in the U.S. for public expenditures. Despite, Perotti (2004, 2007) demonstrates that 
estimates differ considerably between five developed economies and over time, with a 
spectrum of -2.3 to 3.7. Further studies about the USA with minor modifications in the 
identification matrix obtain values of 0.65 on impact but -1 in the long term (Mountford and 
Uhlig (2009)) and even larger than 1 (Fatás and Mihov (2001)). However, one big problem in 
fiscal policy analysis remains, since both taxation and spending changes are usually signalized 
by the government. Therefore these fiscal adjustments are predictable and since they do not 
vary systematically with economic terms, the vector autoregressive model could omit 
important information and thus be misleading due to not involving expected adjustments in 
government spending or income. For that reason it has been stated that the macroeconomic 
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shocks obtained from a VAR do not look like the shocks estimated by other tools, like rational 
expectations of markets. Besides, the shocks obtained from a VAR can display variables 
omitted from the model. These economic shocks will be biased, if the omitted variables 
correlate with the included variables, 
 
Nevertheless, I will employ a VAR approach, since the military buildup strategy seems to be 
inconvenient for my purpose. The baseline model includes three endogenous variables in (log) 
levels: real government spending on goods and services per capita (SPEND), real output per 
capita (GDP), real net tax revenues per capita (TAX) and an exogenous constant term (C).
1
 I 
also include an additional endogenous variable, the long term interest rate (INT) to control for 
monetary policy and debt service because public spending reflects only primary expenditure. 
The long-term interest rate is used, rather than the short-term version, because the former 
should be the more critical for the elements of output like capital expenditure. Further 
information about the exact definition of my variables can be found in section 4 and in the 
Appendix. The vector for the endogenous variables is labeled by 𝑋𝑡 . Together with the 
residual vector  𝑈𝑡 , the reduced form vector can be formally denoted as: 
     𝑋𝑡 = 𝐵 𝐿 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑡  ,  𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
where  𝑋𝑡 =  𝑔𝑡  𝑦𝑡  𝑡𝑡  𝑖𝑡 ' is a four dimensional vector of variables in logarithms, 𝐵 𝐿  is an 






𝑖  ' is the vector of reduced-form shocks. 
All equations include four lags of each endogenous variable. The constant and a linear 
deterministic trend are also included in the standard specification but left out from the 
notation for convenience. 
                                                             
1 Nominal data was deflated using the corresponding deflator, if available, and using the CPI index when such a 
deflator was not available. In some cases data was already deflated directly by the local statistical agencies, 




The Identification Problem 
The reduced form residuals 𝑢𝑡
𝑔
 and 𝑢𝑡
𝑡 , can be seen as linear combinations of three elements: 
At first, there are unexpected changes in taxes in reaction to output shocks for given tax rates, 
also described as automatic response of fiscal variables to innovations in output and interest 
rates. At next there are planned discretionary responses of fiscal policymakers to output or 
interest rate innovations. This might be for example a tax cut, which is implemented as 




𝑡 , which are the structural exogenous shocks, one wants to isolate from the rest. This 
approach can formally be written in the reduced form:  
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which is based on the work by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Theoretically the first two 
components are captured by the coefficients 𝛼𝑗𝑘 . Because 𝑒𝑡
𝑔
 and 𝑒𝑡
𝑡  are correlated with the 
reduced form residuals, the ordinary least squares assumption are not fulfilled. Thus, a simple 
OLS-regression cannot be performed unless further restrictions are made. But if one assumes, 
that systematic discretionary response by policymakers is trivial in quarterly data, since 
budgetary policy decision-making can be sluggish procedure, including various actors in 
administration, legislation and society, the coefficients 𝛼𝑗𝑘  should only capture the automatic 
response of taxes and public spending to exogenous shocks. In this case it is possible to 
determine 𝛼𝑗𝑘 . Consequently one can isolate cyclically adjusted fiscal shocks and use them as 
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In order to define structural fiscal shocks, I go along with the recursive identification scheme 
(Cholesky or recursive decomposition) firstly suggested by Sims (1980). In that respect, the 
sequence of the variables is essential, since it determines the causal direction for their 
interrelations. Another part of the identification problem concerns the relationship between 
government expenditure and tax revenues. The questions is whether spending responses to 
taxes or vice versa. As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) I assume 𝛽𝑔𝑡  to be zero by ordering 
spending first, since Perotti (2004) could show that the correlation between their shocks is 
very low. Hence, the ordering between these two is of little importance. Furthermore also 𝛼𝑦𝑡  
can be assumed to be zero, because the political system involves significant time lags between 
the development and the realization of adjustments of taxation, which could influence GDP. 
Moreover, consumption and investment schedules need some time to adjust to a reform even 
after it has been executed. The sequence of the rest of the variables is trivial, since I am only 
interested in determining the impacts of fiscal policy on output. Finally my chosen order of 
the variables is: Spending, Output, Tax Revenue and the Long-Term Interest Rate.  
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From this perspective GDP reacts simultaneously to adjustments in government expenditure 
but government expenditure does not react to adjustments in GDP at the same time (as in 
Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). Furthermore, GDP simultaneously shapes tax revenues but just 
the opposite is not true. Finally, I assume that the long term real interest rate reacts 





Integration Issues and Impulse Response Functions 
With respect to the time series properties all variables are found to be integrated of order 1. 
Standard unit root and stationarity tests such as the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test are 
applied in all 20 country samples. According to the methodology by Johansen I perform a 
battery of cointegration tests, which suggest the presence of multiple cointegrating vectors for 
most of the countries. Therefore, a vector error correction model (VEC) could be estimated to 
take account of cointegration by imposing reduced-rank restrictions, which would possibly 
lead to more efficient estimates. However, I decided to estimate a VAR in levels to ensure 
better comparability across countries, since it also provides consistent estimates of the VAR 
coefficients and impulse response functions presuming that the asymptotic covariance matrix 
of the parameter estimator is singular (Hamilton, 1994). The impulse response functions are 
represented for the first 12 quarters. Because the vector autoregressive model is estimated in 
levels, there are unit roots or near unit roots in the system. Phillips (1998) demonstrates that 
impulse responses become inconsistent for long-term VAR models under these conditions. 
Hence, impulse responses for longer periods ahead should not be trusted. 
 
The Cross Sectional Regression Analysis 
In order to examine my hypothesis, the coordination index developed by Hall and Gringerich 
(2009) is used to determine the degree of market and strategic coordination across several 
field of political or economic interaction. A common feature of most cross-country growth 
regressions is that the explanatory variables are entered independently and linearly. Hence, 
the following relationship is taken to the data to identify heterogeneity of fiscal policy effect 
in various types of economies:    
∆GD Pi
∆G i




 describes the fiscal spending multiplier and Xk  is the explanatory variable of 
interest, which are: a simple dummy for the type of VoC, three coordination indices as 
constructed by Hall and Gringerich, a labor protection index by the OECD, the wage 
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bargaining coverage ratio, the job tenure, the size of the stock market (measured by market 
capitalization of listed domestic companies in relation to GDP) and shareholder protection 
measured by the anti-director right index (ADRI) developed by La Porta et. al. (1998). At first 
I choose variables that have been focus of past empirical studies about VoC, Xk , and run a 
baseline regression that includes only that variable of interest. The institutional sub-spheres of 
Labor Relations and Corporate Governance are of particular relevance here. At second I 
compute the regression results for some possible linear combinations of up to two Xk -
variables, which have shown significance the 0.05 level. If βk  remains significant and of the 
same sign, one can maintain a fair amount of confidence in that partial correlation. In such a 
case, the result turns out to be robust. If the coefficient does not remain significant or if the 




 variables, because adjustments in the condition information set would change the 
statistical inferences that one draws regarding the Xk  - 
∆GD Pi
∆G i
 relationship. In this case, the 
result turns out as fragile. Unfortunately I had to renounce additional control variables, since 
this final regression only relies on 19 observations. Therefore, including more regressors into 
the equation would come along at additional costs of even less degrees of freedom. 
Consequently, the 19 fiscal multipliers across countries as well as the institutional regressors 
related to the VoC are assumed to be time-invariant, which is nevertheless legitimated for the 
latter by the work about institutional change by Hall and Gringerich, who have shown 
empirically that despite some liberalization movements cross-national differences in 
institutional practices remain strongly persistent even in the face of globalization and 
international convergence tendencies. Though a meaningful disadvantage of such a time-
invariant model is the fact, that it makes it impossible to control for possible effects of 
exchange rate regime switches on the fiscal multiplier such as in a panel-dated VAR-approach 
for various Euro-zone countries by Silva et. al (2013). 
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4. Description of Data 
All the data used in this study are from National Income Accounts and freely available from 
the World Wide Web. The demographic and monetary data (population size, long-term 
interest rates, consumer commodity price index and exchange rates) are taken from the OECD 
website or the respective central banks. The specific sources, variable definitions and time 
frames for each country can be found in the Appendix.  While GDP is deflated by the GDP 
deflator, all the components of national income are expressed in real per capita terms and 
transformed from their nominal values by dividing them by the corresponding deflator, when 
available, and using the CPI index when such a deflator was not available. Besides, all 
variables were non-stationary, with the exception of the long-term interest rate. Following 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) net tax revenues are defined as sum of taxes on production and 
imports, personal income, corporate income and contributions for public social insurances 
subtracted by current transfers payments (treating them as negative taxes). Interest receipts 
and dividends are excluded from the government revenue side. Government spending on the 
other side includes current expenditures for goods and services (final government 
consumption expenditures) and capital expenditures (government investment) also subtracted 
by current transfer payments. Debt service and interest payments are explicitly not part of the 
government spending variable used in this approach. The chosen decomposition of the 
government budget is just one of many opportunities. Many approaches assume that transfer 
payments by the government have different effects than direct public expenditure on goods 
and services: only the latter affects immediately the usage of resources. Thus, adding tax 
revenues and transfers is reasonable, since in the short- and medium run fiscal policy works 
mainly through the demand channel. For a more extensive VAR-estimation of fiscal 
multipliers with further decompositions of government spending and net taxes take a look at 




Data Collection and Availability 
The greatest challenge of this high-frequency study of fiscal policy in a large number of 
countries was collecting and inspecting the data set, since the availability of quarterly fiscal 
variables in developed countries represents the main constraint for the analysis of fiscal policy 
with VAR models. The criterion for inclusion in this study is the availability of non 
interpolated government budget data for the general government, since data reported at a 
quarterly frequency but collected at annual frequency may lead to spurious regression results. 
One common method of interpolating government expenditure data that was collected at 
annual frequency is to use the quarterly seasonal pattern of revenue collection as a proxy for 
the quarterly seasonal pattern of government expenditure (data on tax revenues are more 
commonly collected at quarterly frequency). As tax revenues are highly pro-cyclical, this 
method of interpolation would create a strong correlation between government expenditure 
and output by construction. Using an VAR to identify fiscal shocks with data constructed in 
such a manner would clearly yield economically meaningless results. My analysis was only 
possible due to the fact that numerous countries have begun to collect fiscal data at a quarterly 
frequency. This is attributable mainly to two important changes, which made high-frequency 
fiscal data available for a broader set of countries. First, the adoption of the ESA95, a 
common statistical standard in the European Monetary Union, that encouraged member states 
to collect and classify fiscal data at quarterly frequency
2
. Second, the IMF adopted the Special 
Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) in 1996 and required by its subscribers reports about 
central government expenditure with quarterly frequency recommended. With these 
institutional changes, at least one decade of quarterly data is now available for various 
countries. For this study I collected data on an quarterly basis for 20 developed economies 
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK 
                                                             
2
 See http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/ESA95/en/een00000.htm for more details. 
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and the  US) from different time frames (mostly 1999 to 2015), that have already been 
typified by the VoC literature. One possible inconsistency across countries in my data set 
might be, that in some cases data was deflated and seasonally adjusted directly by the national 
statistical agencies with various methods. In other cases, I deflated the data using a CPI 
deflator myself or rather de-seasonalized it using the X-11 method, where the data shows a 
strong seasonal pattern. This both creates an inconsistency across countries, but moreover 
raises the question of whether consumer prices are the appropriate measure of the ratio 
between the nominal value of government expenditures and their real value. 
 
5. Results 
As a first cut at the data, the sample was divided into market-coordinated and strategic-
coordinated countries. Figures 1 and 2 show the impulse responses to a one standard deviation 
shock to government consumption at time 0 in the first line, and to output in the second line. 
Figure 1 gives responses for a illustrative CME-country (Germany), and Figure 2 for a LME-
country (UK). The response of output to government consumption is in the right-hand panel 
of each figure. Only the German impact response is statistically significant from zero at the 
99% confidence level. To sum it up, two differences stand out between the impulse responses. 
First, the impact response of output to government spending is nearly zero in the UK (-0.01 
percent), but is positive in Germany (0.31 percent), which is also true for all the remaining 
countries in my sample with only one exception - the United States. The U.S. is in fact the 
only liberal market economy, which exhibits a significant positive fiscal expansion effect. 
Second, the output response to a shock in government consumption is significantly less 
persistent in LME-countries like the UK than that of CME-countries such as Germany. While 
the GDP response for coordinated market economies remains significantly positive for all 12 





Focusing only on the short-run impact multiplier, however, might be misleading because 
fiscal stimulus packages can only be implemented over time and there may be lags in the 
economy's response. To account for these factors, Figure 3 shows the accumulated impulse 
response function for both countries at forecast horizons ranging from 0 to 12 quarters. The 
plots report the value of the impact and long-run cumulative fiscal effects. The dashed lines 
give the 95% confidence intervals based on analytical standard errors. 
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Figure 1.1: Impulse Responses to 






















Figure: 1.2: Impulse Responses to 
Governement Spending - Germany 
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Responses to 
Governement Spending - UK 
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses to 




Based on the accumulated impulse responses depicted in Figures 3, we can compute the 
corresponding fiscal multipliers, which are displayed in Figure 4. We can see that the 
cumulative multiplier in Germany rises from an initial value of 0.13 (the impact multiplier 
effect) to a long-run value of 0.63 and is statistically different from zero at every horizon. 
Hence, even after the full impact of a fiscal stimulus is accounted for, output has risen less 
than the cumulative increase in government consumption, implying some crowding out of 
output by government consumption at every time horizon. On the other hand, the cumulative 
long-run multiplier for LME countries is -0.29. In other words, in the long run the increase in 
government consumption is not only fully crowded out by other components of GDP (private 
consumption, investment or net exports), but also results in a reduction in overall output via a 
loss of economic efficiency (often called excess burden).  
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The accumulated multiplier for CME-countries is on average 0.6. In other words, an 
additional dollar of government spending will deliver only 60 cents of additional output 3 
years after it was implemented. This effect of government consumption, while small, is 
statistically significant in most of the coordinated market economies. For LMEs, the 
cumulative multiplier is negative at -0.4, but statistically insignificant from zero. However, 
the difference between the accumulated multiplier in the two groups of countries is 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level as been shown in Figure 5. 
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Institutional drivers for the size of the multiplier 
Next, a closer look is taken at the result of cross-sectional regression analysis. Several 
relationships between the cumulative fiscal multiplier and the institutional features of the VoC 
classification turn out to be significant. A detailed overview about all performed relevant 
regressions can be found in the Appendix. First, there occurs a clear positive linear 
relationship between the fiscal multiplier and the coordination index for labor relations as 
constructed by Hall and Gringerich (2009). This index is based on labor turnover, the degree 
and the level of collective wage bargaining between labor unions and employee associations. 
 
The regression is rerun on single components of this index to identify the original impact on 
the multiplier. By doing so the coefficient for labor protection (as measured by the OECD) 
shows significance at the 95% level, while the median job tenure and the collective bargaining 
coverage rate (according to the World Bank) turn out to be insignificant. Likewise I proceed 
with examining the relationship for the sub-sphere of Corporate Governance and its 
associated variables. While the index itself and the size of stock markets display significant 
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ADRI  does not provide strong significance for any relationship to the cumulative multipliers. 
 
Clearly these results are a big contrast to the predictions of Soskice. Contrary to my 
expectations fiscal policy in CMEs seems to be more efficient. Negative multipliers were 
exclusively found in LMEs, pointing out that a fiscal stimulus in liberal countries could do 
more harm than good to the economy. The only exception is represented by the US, which 
might benefit more from demand-orientated policies due to its huge domestic market 
potential. The export-addicted Ireland on the other side, possess the lowest multiplier. 
Another reason for this condition might be the fact, that it is the only liberal country inside the 
Euro-zone. Thus, Ireland faces serious difficulties with the conservative monetary policy 
stance and further incomplementary CME-structures in the EU. Furthermore these findings 
validate previous studies by the OECD (2006). Accordingly automatic stabilizers and fiscal 
expansions are more complementary than substitute to each other. This fact contradicts the 
viewpoint that institutions and macroeconomic policy positions would complement each other 
to achieve coherence in macroeconomic dynamics as argued in Soskice (2007). Alternatively 
the same logic which explains, why CMEs are expected to have more generous welfare states 
than their liberal counterparts, can illustrate why their fiscal policy could be more effective. 












































struggle finding a new job in case of layoffs. Such layoffs will of course be more probable in 
times of recession. In such periods, a reflationary policy would be in the interest not only of 
workers, but also of firms. In this case applying a fiscal stimulus would be rather 
complementary rather than a subsidiary for a strong welfare state. When employment and 
production are stimulated by counter-cyclical fiscal policy, an extensive welfare state could be 
stabilized in political and economic terms and ultimately improve household's confidence in 
the overall stability of the system. Therefore, instead of precautionary saving, a much more 
positive outlook on consumption can be expected, which could explain smaller crowding-out 
effects in non-liberal countries. 
 
6. Conclusion:  
This work project examined the relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth by 
differentiating production regimes that characterize countries. As recently proposed in the 
VoC literature LMEs would be expected to conduct a more effective fiscal policy compared 
to non-liberal varieties, where more precautionary saving takes place due to 
complementarities between their stance on fiscal policy, welfare state concepts and ADMRs. 
Following the VoC-typology, VAR models were performed to determine the size of fiscal 
multipliers for a panel of 19 OECD countries. After regressing various institutional variables 
on the computed multipliers, the obtained results claim the exact opposite of the expected 
relationship. One possible explanation for this might be that fiscal expansionary policy is 
complementary to automatic stabilizers like for instance a more generous welfare state. Also 
other explanations combining characteristics of political economies to the stand on fiscal 
policy (the small-N problem in collective bargaining or the common pool problem for public 
spending) might be notable in this context. Nevertheless, my results suggest that the VoC-
approach is not only limited to formal rules such as in labor protection, but is also expressed 
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